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I. INTRODUCTION
In the earliest common law cases, there was little question of the
competence or ability of jurors. Each juror had personal knowledge of
the events that formed the basis of the trial. Further, medieval society
was technologically simple; few trials presented subject matter beyond
the jurors' own level of knowledge.
Dean, University of Nebraska College of Law. This paper was originally pre-
pared for and delivered at a Wingspread Conference, "The American Jury and
the Law" on November 18-20, 1985, sponsored by the American Judicature Soci-
ety and the Johnson Foundation. David G. Newkirk, Class of 1987, made a signif-
icant contribution, both in substance and documentation, in adapting the paper
for publication. Keith Miles, Class of 1987, assisted in the research for the origi-
nal presentation. I also benefited from comments received when an early draft of
the paper was presented to the Law-Psychology workshop at the University of
Nebraska. Any errors or misstatements that survived in spite of this assistance
are mine.
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The Renaissance and the growth of cities changed not only society
but the administration of law. Population increase meant that jurors
no longer knew the litigants. At the same time, the legal system be-
gan to wrestle with the consequences of scientific progress. Specializa-
tion forced the legal regulation of increasingly diverse areas, many of
which were undoubtedly alien to the juror.
Modern criticism of the jury takes at least two forms. One popular
lay perception is that the jury system is inefficient and perhaps un-
workable.' This line of criticism has its origins in the public's dis-
enchantment with the delay and sometimes questionable verdicts in
jury trials.2 There is in this view the implication of an inherent flaw
in the idea that untutored lay persons can have a sensible role in legal
decisionmaking. Another line of criticism focuses on the size and con-
ceptual complexity of some modern litigation. In its most extended
form this criticism has led some courts to create a "complexity" excep-
tion to the right to a jury trial guaranteed in the seventh amendment.3
Some jury decisions do startle the legal profession and the body
politic. Permissive joinder rules and extended discovery have pro-
duced a more factually complex litigation and hence difficulties for
the jury. The sheer bulk of issues and evidence in some litigation bor-
ders on unmanageability.4 The conceptual difficulty of some suits has
1. See, e.g., Friedrich, We, the Jury, Find the... That Irksome, Boring, Vital, Re-
warding, Democratic Ecperience, TmE, Sept. 28, 1981, at 44; Zoeller, Beyond a
Jury's Ability, A.B.A. J. Sept. 1985, at 39. Although this criticism has its roots in
the lay public, the legal community has also repeated similar criticisms. Chief
Justice Burger has been a frequent critic of the jury system. See, e.g., Burger, The
State of the Federal Judiciary-1971, 57 A.B.A. J. 855, 858 (1971); Interview with
Chief Justice Warren Burger, 69 U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP. 32 (Dec. 14, 1970);
Burger, Is Our Jury System Working?, READER's DIG. Feb. 1981, at 126.
2. See Friedrich, supra note 1, at 46-47. See also Farrell, Communication in the
Courtroom: Jury Instructions, 85 W. VA. L. REV. 5, 15-16 (1982).
3. The seventh amendment states in full:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
A number of courts have used a variety of theories to create an exception to
this language in large, complex suits. See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Anti-
trust LAtig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79
F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D.
Wash. 1976). See also infra note 8.
4. One suit, In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert
denied sub nom. Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980), is illustrative of the
kind of case that modern jurors sometimes face. The suit involved 18 joined suits
surrounding the collapse of a coast-to-coast real estate developer. Pre-trial dis-
covery generated 150,000 pages of depositions and at least 100,000 pages of docu-
mentary evidence. "[From a lawyer's perspective, reading those 100,000 pieces of
paper would be like sitting down to read the first 90 volumes of the Federal Re-
porter, 2nd Series-including all the headnotes." In re United States Fin. Sec.
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also proven troublesome for the jury. When one jury in a complex
antitrust suit deadlocked, the court asked the jury foreman whether
that type of case should be tried before a jury. The foreman indicated
that the only qualified juror would be "both a computer technician, a
lawyer, [and] an economist."5
Whatever inherent limitations exist in jury trials, there are a vari-
ety of reforms that have altered and quite likely improved the func-
tioning of the jury trial even in complex cases. Appointment of special
masters6 and bifurcated trials7 may have made some trials more man-
ageable, and permitting juries to ask questions and to take notes may
enhance the decisionmaking process. Central to the proper function-
ing of a jury in simple as well as in complex cases is the effectiveness
of the instructions on the law.8 There is much to be said for Chief
Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702, 707 (S.D. Cal. 1977). See also In re Japanese Elec. Prod.
Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980). This suit involved a discovery pro-
cess "which after nine years has produced millions of documents and over 100,000
pages of depositions." Id. at 1073.
5. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machs., 458 F. Supp. 423,
447 (N.D. Cal. 1978), affd on other grounds sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. Interna-
tional Business Machs., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1981) (mem.).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
7. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(d)(1).
8. A number of sources have indicated that drafting comprehensible jury instruc-
tions may be a more appropriate response to complex cases than denying a liti-
gant the right to a jury trial. In one study of complex suits, the author
recommended that the jury be supplied with written instructions. He continued
by noting that the "[a]vailability [of written instructions] is a waste, however, un-
less the instructions are written to be understood. The parties should be en-
couraged to engage in comprehension testing and redrafting." A. AUSTIN,
COMPLEX LITIGATION CONFRONTs THE JURY SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY 104 (1984).
Other sources have not gone this far, but have noted that well-written instruc-
tions would improve complex suits for the jury. See, e.g., S.R.I. Int'l v. Matsushita
Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1131-33 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (additional views of Markey,
C.J.); Sperlich, Better Judicial Management. The Best Remedy for Complex
Cases, 65 JUDICATURE 415, 418-19 (1982); Withrow & Suggs, Procedures for Im-
proving Jury Trials of Complex Litigation, 25 ANTITRUST BULL. 493, 507 (1980).
Research that shows that juror comprehension is improved by drafting more
comprehensible instructions undermines all three of the legal theories used to
justify a "complexity exception" to the seventh amendment. The first legal the-
ory used to limit the seventh amendment is that "the principles of procedural due
process would seem to impose some limitations on the range of cases that may be
submitted to a jury .... ." In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d
1069, 1084 (3d Cir. 1980). Due process thus precludes a jury trial when the jury
cannot perform its "task with a reasonable understanding of the evidence and the
legal rules." Id. (emphasis added). Psycholinguistic research indicates that the
jurors do not understand because the lawyers fail to communicate. Presumably,
the availability of the less dramatic alternative-improvement of jury instruc-
tions-reduces the need to abandon the seventh amendment in the face of due
process concerns.
A second theory is that "[e]quity has jurisdiction over cases in which there is
no adequate remedy at law. The inability of a juror to handle complex cases and
[Vol. 65:520
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Judge Markey's observation that "[t]here is no peculiar cachet which
removes 'technical' subject matter from the competency of a jury
when competent counsel have carefully marshalled and presented the
evidence of that subject matter and a competent judge has supplied
carefully prepared instructions."9
Regardless of the complexity of the case, the clarity of the jury
instructions must have some impact on jury decisionmaking. Many
lawyers intuitively have assumed that the highly jargoned instructions
so common in modern litigation were not comprehended by lay jurors.
But in recent years this intuition has given way to scientific proof as
social scientists have documented the gap between what is instructed
and what is understood. Behavioral scientists also have provided gui-
dance for the drafting of jury instructions designed to improve juror
comprehension.
In the 1970's, Professor Stephen SaltzburgO and I had an opportu-
nity to use the psycholinguistic techniques recommended by Elwork,
Sales and Alfinill to draft a set of civil pattern jury instructions for
the Alaska courts.-2 Our proposal to simplify the instructions using
the techniques recommended by Elwork and his co-authors struck a
responsive chord. Alaskan juries range from an urban composite in
Anchorage and Fairbanks to predominately rural and native juries
render a fair decision means that there is no'adequate remedy at law. Therefore,
complex cases are within equity jurisdiction and there exists no right to jury trial
in them." In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 417 (9th Cir. 1979). If
the juror's ability to handle complex cases is improved by simplified instructions,
this basis for equitable jurisdiction may disappear.
The third justification for a complexity exception seizes on the significance of
a footnote in Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970). In Ross, the Court stated that
the considerations in determining whether the seventh amendment applies to a
given suit include "the practical abilities and limitations of juries." Id. at 538 n.10.
The majority of courts after Ross have treated the statement as dictum. See, e.g.,
In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 417 (9th Cir. 1979); Radial Lip
Mach., Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224, 226-27 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
However, if Ross is perceived as having constitutional dimensions, psycholinguis-
tic research shows that jurors may have fewer "limitations" than is commonly
believed.
9. SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107,1130 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (additional
views of Markey, J.).
10. Professor Saltzburg is Professor of Law at the University of Virginia Law School.
Although he bears his fair share of the responsibility for the Alaska and federal
jury instructions, he is not responsible for this Article. He has, however, made
helpful suggestions.
11. See A. ELwoRK, B. SALES & J. ALFINI, MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTAND-
ABLE (1982); Elwork, Alfini & Sales, Toward Understandable Jury Instructions,
65 JUDICATURE 432 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Elwork I); Elwork, Sales & Alfini,
Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of lt?, 1 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
163 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Eiwork II].
12. H. PERLMAN & S. SALTZBURG, ALASKA PATTERN CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
(1981).
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above the Arctic Circle. Simplicity of expression was a prime concern.
We were encouraged to use any available methodology to simplify the
instructions.
The completion of the civil instructions for Alaska coincided with
the publication of Making Jury Instructions Understandable by
Elwork, Sales and Alfini.13 The book outlines a step-by-step process
for lawyers who wish to draft more understandable jury instructions.
Given the apparent interest in the subject, we developed a set of pat-
tern instructions for federal criminal cases using the authors' method-
ology. This venture coincided with the increasing interest of the
Federal Judicial Center and various federal circuits in simplified in-
structions.14 The resulting product was a three volume set on Federal
Criminal Jury Instructions1 5 in which we again attempted to imple-
ment the teachings of the social science community.
Although we incorporated what social scientists told us about the
art of instruction drafting, the Alaska civil and federal criminal in-
structions are the work of lawyers.16 We cannot be certain that we
implemented what we learned from social scientists or that, if we did,
it had the desired result of improving juror comprehension. We tried
to be faithful to science until our intuition convinced us that a particu-
lar context called for a departure.
This Article reviews some of the studies relating to jury decision-
making and the drafting of jury instructions. It then describes in
greater detail some of the decisions we made in the process of drafting
instructions for Alaska and the Federal system. The Article concludes
with my own observations regarding the role of the jury and the theo-
retical and practical problems of attempting to implement the re-
search of social scientists in the real world.
II. SOCIAL SCIENCES AND JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The jury system has been a favorite focus of social scientists. The
American juror is without special knowledge and expertise; he is par-
ticularly easy and cheap to replicate for experimental purposes. Col-
lege students, for example, provide an easily accessible, captive, and
qualified pool of subjects.
A jury trial is also a rigidly controlled decisionmaking process. Ev-
idence is presented in a structured format, and the jury is instructed to
13. A. ELWORK, B. SALES & J. ALFINI, supra note 11.
14. See generally Quade, Federal Judges Simplify Jury Instructions, 68 A.B.A. J.
1066 (1982).
15. S. SALTZBURG & H. PERLMAN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTONS (1985).
16. One difference between a social scientist and a lawyer may be that the scientist
tests his instincts empirically while the lawyer remains content to act upon his
intuition. We did not attempt to go beyond the most casual of empirical tests on
any of the instructions we drafted or the conclusions we reached.
[Vol. 65:520
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ignore everything else. It is fairly easy for social scientists to replicate
this controlled environment and to manipulate the few operative
variables.
Finally, the jury is a favored source of experimentation because
some in the legal arena express concerns about the jury and its role.
Many lawyers trained to resolve complex controversies may be dubi-
ous of the wisdom of turning controversies over to untutored and
largely undisciplined laypersons.17 On the other hand, those lawyers
supportive of the jury are also supportive of reforms designed to im-
prove and thus preserve it. Trial judges, increasingly captives of their
growing case loads, may be impatient with the inefficiencies of a jury
trial. Social scientists find then a profession that is fairly receptive to
their challenges of current jury practices and their proposals for re-
form. Presumably social scientists, like the rest of us, prefer to work
on issues that are perceived to be problems by those in a position to
adopt proposed solutions.
A. Kalven and Zeisel-The American Jury
The most heroic studies of the American jury remain those con-
ducted at the University of Chicago during the 1950's. That effort was
brought together by Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel in The American
Jury, published in 1966.18 The core of the study was a review of actual
jury cases and the measurement and evaluation of the agreement or
disagreement between the jury and the trial judge as to the preferred
outcome in each case. Some 3000 criminal cases formed the basis of
the study.
Kalven and Zeisel did not focus extensively on the role that jury
instructions might have played in causing agreement or disagreement
between the jury and the judge. One important implication of the
study, however, is that in approximately seventy-five percent of the
cases, the judge and jury agreed on the preferred outcome. 19 In these
cases one might assume either that the jury understood the instruc-
tions, or understood what the judge intended by the instructions, or
that any misunderstanding of the instructions did not influence the
outcome.
17. 'Plain language" pattern jury instructions initially met with similar resistance.
One trial judge stated.
Ours is a respectable profession, quasi-scientific in nature, and com-
prised of learned men, and to require them to indulge in the language of
the streets in preference to a more literary style is to debase an honora-
ble calling, which, in this skeptical age, could use a little increase in stat-
ure rather than the contrary.
Laub, Trial and Submission of a Case from a Judge's Standpoint, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 1,
10 (1960).
18. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AmmicAN JuRY (1966).
19. A at 56, 63.
1986]
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Kalven and Zeisel isolated five possible explanations for those
cases in which judge and jury disagreed. Disagreements were attribu-
table to:
1. Different sentiments on the law 29%
2. Different sentiments on the defendant 11%
3. Issues of evidence 54%
4. Facts only the judge knew 2%
5. Disparity of counsel 4%20
Although issues of evidence caused more than half of the disagree-
ments, Kalven and Zeisel discovered no empirical support for the hy-
pothesis that the jurors misunderstood the evidence. However, they
did find empirical support for three alternative explanations: the lib-
eration hypothesis-that conflicts in evidence freed the jury to follow
its sentiment about the law or the particular defendant;2 ' the credibil-
ity hypothesis-that the jury and judge had different views on the
credibility of witnesses;22 and the reasonable doubt hypothesis-that
the jury and judge applied different thresholds of reasonable doubt.23
The Kalven and Zeisel study concluded that the jury agreed with
the judge in a large percentage of the cases. Within the cases of disa-
greement the jury was disciplined by the evidence; where doubt arose
the jury allowed its sentiment to sway it in one direction or another.24
The study also demonstrated, however, that the judge and jury dis-
agreed very little in those cases in which the judge exercised substan-
tial control over the jury through instructions, a summary of the
evidence, and observations on the weight and credibility of the
evidence.25
If Kalven and Zeisel's study is correct, the range of jury departure
from the judicial base line is small and can be controlled by the trial
judge if he chooses to intrude substantially into the trial. Within the
relatively narrow range of disagreement between judge and jury, the
comprehensibility of the jury instructions may have some role to play
in harnessing juror sentiment and reducing the incidence of
disagreement.
B. History of Jury Instructions
The history of jury decisionmaking and jury instructions provide
interesting insights into the problem of testing for and improving ju-
ror competency. Prior to the fifteenth century, jurors knew the facts
20. Id- at 115.
21. Id, at 164-67.
22. Id. at 168-81.
23. Id- at 182-90.
24. Id. at 164-67.
25. Id- at 425-27.
[Vol. 65:520
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of the events they judged and exercised broad decisionmaking discre-
tion.26 Judges exercised control over juries through the method of
"attaint," a system of calling a second jury to review the verdict of the
first. If the second jury disagreed with the first jury's decision, the
members of the first jury were subject to severe punishment.27
The fifteenth century jury evolved into an unbiased and detached
decisionmaking body that resolved disputes based on the evidence at
trial. If the judge believed the jury decided the case incorrectly, mem-
bers of the jury could still be punished.28 Although judges were not
expected to instruct juries unless requested by the jury, jurors soon
realized that it was wise to see in advance how the judge thought the
case ought to come out rather than risk punishment if they guessed
wrong.
In 1670 in Bushnel's case,29 an English court finally held that ju-
rors could not be personally punished for failing to decide the case as
the judge desired.3 0 Attaint by a second jury sufficiently checked the
decisionmaking of the first, and since this was the only check, juries
became the ultimate decider of the law as well as the facts. It was not
until the eighteenth century that judges could grant a new trial to
cure a faulty jury verdict.
In the United States early juries were not instructed at all and
were regarded as equal to the judge in their ability to interpret the
common law. The common law was believed to be built on commonly
shared values and thus who better to decide the law than the jury.31 It
26. The jury was a body of neighbours called in, either by express law,
or by the consent of the parties, to decide disputed questions of fact. The
decision upon questions of fact was left to them because they were al-
ready acquainted with them, or if not already so acquainted with them,
because they might easily acquire the necessary knowledge. For this
reason, it has been said that the primitive jury were witnesses to rather
than judges of the facts.
1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 317 (7th ed. 1956).
27. "If the original jury was convicted by the attaint jury, sentence followed in one
sterotyped form. They were imprisoned for a year, forfeited their goods, became
infamous, their wives and children were turned out, and their lands laid waste."
Id. at 341.
28. The combination of attaint and the judge's power to punish the jury often posed a
cruel dilemma: "If they do follow his direction, they may be attainted, and the
judgment revers'd for doing that, which if they had not done, they should have
been fined and imprisoned by the judge .... " Bushnel's Case, Vaughan's Rep.
135, 147, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1012 (1670).
29. Vaughan's Rep. 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (1670).
30. Id at 147-48, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1012-13.
31. Two early American documents reflect this belief that "[t]he general Rules of
Law and common regulations of Society, under which ordinary Transactions ar-
range[d] themselves... [were] well enough known to ordinary jurors." W. NEL-
SON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAw 26 (1975) (quoting 1 LEGAL PAPERS
OF JOHN ADAMS 230 (L. Worth & H. Zoebel eds. 1965)). A second source ex-
plained to the jurors that they "need[ed] no Explanation [since] your good sense
1986]
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was not until the end of the nineteenth century that state legislatures
and courts required that the trial judge instruct the jury and empow-
ered him to grant a new trial as a means of exacting compliance with
his instructions. In 1895 in Sparf and Hansen v. United States,32 the
Supreme Court held that jurors did not have the right to decide ques-
tions of law, even in criminal cases. 33 The law applicable to the case,
therefore, had to be given to the jury by the trial judge.
Thereafter, appellate courts reviewed jury instructions as a means
of insuring that trial judges stated the law accurately, and in response,
trial judges began to expand and fashion their instructions in an effort
to avoid appellate reversal. As instructions became more and more
protective and complex, pattern jury instructions evolved-instruc-
tions drafted in advance to be used in all applicable cases. The Los
Angeles Superior Court adopted the first set of pattern instructions in
the late 1930's, an event that led to the adoption of state-wide pattern
jury instructions in California.34 Since then, almost all jurisdictions
have adopted some form of pattern jury instructions.
The history of trial by jury is instructive. Throughout much of its
development, the jury had control of law as well as fact. The jury was
thought to bring some measure of community consensus to legal deci-
sionmaking-the same phenomenon that Kalven and Zeisel argued
explained much of the jury-judge disagreement in more recent cases.
Thus, some degree of discretion to depart from the judge's view of the
case has been an historic characteristic of the jury. It is also comfort-
ing to realize that our concern about juror comprehension of instruc-
tions is relatively new, and that we are only ninety years away from
the time when juries decided questions of law.
C. Social Science Investigations
Since 1970 a series of empirical studies have documented first, that
pattern jury instructions are not completely understood by the jurors
to whom they are addressed, and second, that the use of certain tech-
niques of drafting and organization improve juror comprehension.
In 1976 Strawn and Buchanan examined juror comprehension of
& understanding will Direct ye as to them." W. NELSON, supra, at 26, (quoting
Grand Jury Charge, 1 CUSHING PAPERS (1759) (collection of Mass. Hist. Soc'y,
Boston)).
32. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
33. Id at 106-07. Two Justices dissented, stating that "[lt is our deep and settled
conviction... that the jury... have the right, as well as the power, to decide,
according to their own judgment and consciences, all questions, whether of law or
of fact, involved. Id. at 114 (Gray, J., dissenting).
34. THE JUDGES OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF Los ANGELES COUNTY, CALIFORNIA,
BOOK OF APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS (1938).
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Florida's criminal pattern jury instructions. 35 Randomly selected
Florida jurors were shown videotaped jury instructions and were then
tested by a multiple choice, true/false test to measure their compre-
hension. A control group was given the test without viewing any in-
structions. Jurors who had received instructions knew more than
those who had not, but the instructed jurors still missed thirty percent
of the test items, and on four issues regarded by the study's authors as
critical, including an understanding of the concept of "reasonable
doubt," the instructed jurors showed no better understanding than the
control group.3 6
In 1977, Elwork, Sales, and Alfini published the first results of a
large study they conducted utilizing the Michigan civil pattern instruc-
tions.37 Again, random subjects viewed videotaped instructions and
were then compared against a control group that had been given no
instructions. In one study the subjects watched an entire videotaped
trial to provide a factual context. Again, the authors found that tradi-
tional pattern jury instructions did not provide a significant measure
of comprehension beyond that of the control group.38 They found, in
fact, a nearly forty-percent rate of misunderstanding among those who
viewed the traditional pattern instructions.3 9
However, Elwork, Sales, and Alfini went further. Utilizing
psycholinguistic literature, and, I think they will admit, a substantial
measure of common sense, they redrafted the traditional instructions
to improve juror comprehension. The literature they employed and
the techniques they adopted focused on vocabulary, grammar, and or-
ganization. They replaced legal jargon with common words, abstract
words with concrete words, and negative words with positive words.
Homonyms-words with multiple meanings-were avoided.
Their revised instructions were sensitive to grammatical construc-
tion that had been shown empirically to improve comprehension.
They avoided, where possible, embedded and compound sentences and
the passive voice. They adopted what some social scientists termed a
hierarchical and algorithmic organization scheme which breaks down
35. Strawn & Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478
(1976).
36. Id at 480-83. Although I disclaim any expertise in empirical validity, as a lawyer I
am uncomfortable with these findings. The jurors did not deliberate, they did not
have a context within which to understand or apply the instructions as they did
not see a trial, and they were not asked to apply the instructions. They were, in
fact, given a test much like students in a classroom. Judged in that context a 73%
on a test is by any normal measure a passing grade. This study, although not
conclusive, did encourage more sophisticated efforts.
37. Elwork II, supra note 11.
38. Id- at 175.
39. Id at 176. The authors found 10 errors out of 25 in a control group, and 15 errors
out of 39 with traditional pattern instructions.
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general concepts into component parts such that concepts flow from
previously explained concepts. Empirical tests demonstrated that
their revised instructions heightened comprehension by lay jurors.
In 1982 the same authors published a book-length treatment of the
subject entitled Making Jury Instructions Understandable,40 which
reports on a wider test sample, refines the linguistic rules that demon-
strably improve comprehension, and then sets out a step-by-step pro-
cess through which lawyers (or others) may both rewrite instructions
to improve understanding and empirically test their efforts.
A similar project was conducted by Charrow and Charrow and
published in the Columbia Law Review in 1979.41 In their study sub-
jects listened to instructions and were then asked to paraphrase what
they had heard.42 Comparing the traditional to the linguistically re-
vised instructions, they concluded again that much could be done to
improve juror comprehension.4 3
In two more recent studies,44 Severance, Green, and Loftus carried
the empirical observations a step further. To find sources of misun-
derstanding, they surveyed those cases in which juries had asked the
judge questions during deliberations. They isolated three particularly
bothersome instructions-those dealing with intent, reasonable doubt,
and the use of evidence of prior convictions.45
In the first study, jury-eligible college students viewed an hour-
long videotape of a burglary trial and were then divided into six
groups. One group received no instructions, one received a general
instruction telling it what its duties were, and one received specific
pattern instructions on the three areas to be studied. Half of each of
these groups deliberated, the other half did not.
The authors examined the "jurors" through a questionnaire to de-
termine whether they could distinguish between correct and incorrect
expressions of the relevant law.46 In a separate test to determine
whether jurors could apply the instructions to novel fact situations,
the jurors were given ten hypothetical situations and asked to evalu-
ate the outcome. 47
Comprehension measures replicated the earlier studies. Subjects
40. J. ALFINI, B. SALEs & A. ELWORK, supra note 11.
41. Charrow & Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguis-
tic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COL. L. REV. 1306 (1979).
42. Id, at 1309-11.
43. Id. at 1358-59.
44. Severance, Greene & Loftus, Toward Criminal Jury Instructions that Jurors can
Understand, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198 (1984); Severance & Loftus, Im-
proving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instruc-
tions, 17 L. & Soc'Y R. 153 (1982).
45. Severance, Greene & Loftus, supra note 44, at 203-04.
46. Id. at 205-06.
47. Id, at 206.
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receiving no instructions missed 35.6% of the questions on comprehen-
sion, subjects receiving the general instruction only missed 34.7%, and
subjects receiving the specific instructions erred 29.6% of the time.48
In measuring the subject's ability to apply the law to new situa-
tions, subjects receiving specific instructions did apply the law cor-
rectly more often, but the specific instruction on intent actually
diminished that ability.49
The authors then redrafted the specific instructions using the
psycholinguistic techniques developed by the Charrows and Elwork
groups and obtained consistently more accurate responses. Jurors re-
ceiving the redrafted specific instructions had an error in comprehen-
sion of 20.3%.50
In a second, more detailed study, the same authors used both ex-
jurors and persons who had been called for jury duty. They discov-
ered that the more experienced jurors had greater accuracy of com-
prehension. They also replicated the finding that their revised
instructions aided comprehension, particularly when jurors were able
to deliberate.51 They also used the Charrow technique of asking ju-
rors to paraphrase instructions and again found their revised instruc-
tions were better understood.52
The Severance group also surveyed trial judges throughout the
country to determine whether the group's set of revised instructions
were regarded as correct statements of the law. They concluded that
judges would accept as accurate their revised instructions.
III. ALASKA CIVIL AND FEDERAL CRIMINAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Against the background of these social science efforts, we drafted
both the Alaska civil and federal criminal jury instructions. Elwork,
Sales and Alfini influenced us most since their work was really a "how
to" manual for drafting jury instructions. Interestingly, most of their
rules for clear writing are as applicable to drafting jury instructions as
to anything else.
The first object was to improve the organization of the sets of in-
structions. In most pattern instruction books, each instruction is a
pebble in alien juxtaposition to others. We tried to think through a
case of negligence or mail fraud and draft a set of instructions that
48. Id
49. Id at 207.
50. Id. at 213. By comparison, jurors receiving the pattern instruction had a 24.3%
error rate, and jurors receiving no instruction had an error rate of 29.3%. The
difference was statistically significant.
51. Id. at 218-19.
52. Id at 221-24.
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reflected an understandable organizational scheme. We tried to de-
velop transitions necessary for understanding.
Our first instruction within any set became a general "elements"
instruction that tells the jury what the case is about and, in a one, two,
three format, what the jury must decide. The general elements in-
struction is followed, where necessary, by further instructions on each
of the elements. We also used transitions and road-map instructions
such as, "First, I will tell you what things you need to decide and then
I will explain each of these things to you."5 3
Of course, a major task of simplifying instructions is to replace
legal jargon with simple words. For example,
We use: Instead of:
win prevail
help or encourage aid or abet
trick or plan device, scheme, or artifice
deliberately willfully
In most instances, however, legal terms are shorthand expressions
for detailed concepts, and our approach was generally to describe the
concept for the jury in simplified language. Three examples of these
efforts are reproduced in the appendices to this Article. The first is
our attempt to define obscenity without using the term "prurient."5 4
The second example from the Alaska instructions attempts to avoid
using the terms "bailor" and "bailee." 55 The third represents an effort
to explain how to define a product market in antitrust litigation with-
out using the term "cross-elasticity of demand."6
Legal terms are often used in pattern instructions as a method of
generalization. Thus the term "security" is a general term for a vari-
ety of financial instruments such as stocks, bonds, certificates of in-
debtedness, etc. Pattern instructions tend to use the generic terms
because they are written in the abstract outside the context of a partic-
ular case. We have urged judges through the structure of our instruc-
tions to refer to the case-specific item when possible. If common stock
is involved the instructions should use the term "common stock." It is
only when an ambiguous instrument is involved that the general term
"security" followed by a definition is necessary.
53. For an example of a "traditional" mail fraud instruction, see 2 E. DEvrrr & C.
BLAcKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS §§ 47.03-47.05 (3d ed.
1977). By contrast, our simplified instruction uses transitions, road maps, and a
one, two, three structure. See infra Appendix A.
54. See infra Appendix B. A more traditional instruction (infra Appendix C) is
shorter but involves legal connotations that may be lost on a lay jury.
55. See infra Appendix D. For an example of a more traditional instruction using
the terms "bailor" and "bailee," see infra Appendix E.
56. See infra Appendix F. For an example of a traditional instruction defining a
product market using legal jargon, see infra Appendix G.
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Pattern instructions can bridge the gap between abstraction and
case-specific instructions by providing opportunities for the judge to
adapt the instruction to the facts of a particular case. We also urge
judges in our commentary to limit instructions to the case at hand.
There is no reason to educate the jury for education sake.
Even the revised instructions retain some legal terms. There are
really two approaches to simplifying legal terms. One can substitute
common words or extended descriptions or one can use the legal term
and provide a definition. We employed both techniques as our intu-
itions dictated.
Social scientists may tell us the definition approach is less satisfac-
tory. However, in many instances legal terms will be used by the
judge and the lawyers throughout the trial and to avoid these terms in
the instructions may divorce the instructions from the language of the
trial. Thus we do not avoid the words "obscenity" or "interstate com-
merce" or "materiality."
In some instructions legal language is used because of historical
controversies long since settled. An example is the instruction that
tells the jury that matters can be proved by both direct and circum-
stantial evidence. In the past there had been dispute over the role of
circumstantial evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence no longer
draw a distinction,57 and we recommend no instruction be given.s
We also abandoned use of the terms "presumption" and "infer-
ence" in jury instructions. Inferences from evidence are always neces-
sary and always made. To highlight some but not all such occasions
may be confusing. There are times, however, when the law requires
an instruction. In these instances we propose that the process of draw-
ing inferences be explained.59
Jury instructions often employ legal terms in order to structure
but not to eliminate the discretion of the jury. These terms are left
without bright parameters in order to facilitate the jury's obligation to
impose some form of community standard. In civil cases the best ex-
ample is the concept of negligence in which the law invites the jury to
apply the community standards of reasonable care without much
"legal" direction.60
On the criminal side, reasonable doubt may be a similar concept,
and accordingly we have urged judges not to attempt to define it with
too much precision. For example, in the mail fraud instructions we
57. See FED. R. EViD. 401 and advisory committee note.
58. 1 S. SALTZBuRG & H. PERLUN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1.13
(1985).
59. See infra Appendix H. By contrast, a traditional instruction (infra Appendix I)
explains the term, not the process.
60. See infra Appendix I. For an example of a California instruction using a more
traditional "reasonable prudence" type of formulation, see infra Appendix K.
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incorporate the burden of proof as to each element and propose a gen-
eral instruction on "burden of proof."61
Reforming the language of jury instructions alone will not solve
the problem of jury misunderstanding. Peripheral issues are also im-
portant. For example, if the instructions are in simplified language, it
is counterproductive to have the judge read to the jury a complex and
jargon-filled indictment or statute. Instead, trial judges should sum-
marize the indictment and statute in simple language. The prosecu-
tion may resist this recommendation since it is advantageous to the
prosecutor to have the judge read what amounts to the prosecution's
opening statement.
In some instances jury instructions could also be simplified by leav-
ing more to the arguments of counsel. Some traditional instructions
tend to state a decision for the jury followed by a list of factual ele-
ments the jury can use to make its decision. Although these kinds of
instructions may be inevitable, we generally urge in the comments
that factual discussions be left to trial counsel. The more detailed in-
structions are a subtle means of judicial comment on the evidence and
our bias is to leave the trial to the lawyers.
The timing of the instructions and other procedures that surround
the giving of instructions also affect juror understanding. There is
literature to confirm the common sense notion that giving instructions
only at the end of the trial is not the most effective method to increase
juror understanding of the case. 62 We propose sets of general instruc-
tions for use at the outset of the trial, during the trial, and at the end
of the trial. We suggest that at the beginning of the trial the judge
give a brief summary instruction of the elements of the case to give
the jury some framework to evaluate the evidence. We also suggest
instructions for juror notetaking and for giving jurors written copies
of the instruction.
IV. IMPLEMENTING SOCIAL SCIENCE INTO
THE REAL WORLD
The true skeptic might say that the social science studies of juror
comprehension have only confirmed what any lawyer or judge already
knew from experience. To some degree this is correct; most lawyers
and judges who think about the traditional instructions they use rec-
ognize that those instructions have limitations for juror comprehen-
sion. Very little in the social science literature is counter-intuitive, yet
61. See infra Appendix L. A traditional burden of proof instruction is set out infra
Appendix M.
62. See, e.g., A. AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 104; Prettyman, Jury Instructions - First or
Last?, 46 A.B.A. J. 1066 (1960); Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries:
Problems and Remedies, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 731, 755-56 (1981); Winslow, The In-
struction Ritual, 13 HAST. L.J. 456, 470-71 (1962).
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lawyers and judges are often reluctant to direct wholesale change in
legal process based on their intuition, particularly when the alterna-
tives are not readily available. The recent attention focused on juror
understanding by social scientists has highlighted and given an objec-
tive, empirical confirmation of the legal profession's suspicions and
has thus created a receptive climate for reform.
System-wide change in the law, as in most industries, will not come
from without but must percolate up from within. Social scientists
alone cannot, regardless of the force of their arguments or the power
of their statistics, effectuate broad-scale change. Lawyers must do it.
The work of Elwork, Sales, and Alfini and the Charrows is particu-
larly helpful social science. The Charrows provide a list of techniques
for drafting simplified instructions 63 and Elwork's group not only pro-
vides the techniques but a method of testing the results.64 Both of
these studies go beyond proving juror misunderstanding by providing
tools for lawyers to improve the drafting of instructions.
Now that social scientists have confirmed that a significant amount
of juror misunderstanding results from current jury instructions, the
path of reform is wide and clearly marked. Much can be accomplished
in simplifying the language of jury instructions. At the same time,
juror comprehension, if carried to an extreme, may sacrifice other
equally important attributes of the jury system. It may not be prema-
ture to explore some of the limitations and restraints that might ar-
guably temper the search for simplified instructions.
A. Balancing the Need for Specialized Language against the Goal of
Juror Comprehension
Jury instructions continue to serve as the media for multiple
messages. The focus of social science research has been to facilitate
the communication of legal rules to a lay juror for their application by
him to the facts of a particular case. This is a very important function
of jury instructions, but it is not the only function. In the context of a
jury trial the instructions also perform a major procedural function in
focusing for counsel and the court the legal matters in dispute.
At the trial, the jury sees only a small part of the jousting between
the contending parties. Arguments over the applicable law take place
between judge and counsel and are directed toward the instructions
ultimately given the jury. The instructions are the medium for this
essentially intraprofessional discussion, and they serve a similar func-
tion when an appellate court reviews the case on appeal. Because the
63. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 41, at 1336-40. See also supra notes 40-42 and
accompanying text.
64. A. ELwoRK, B. SALES & J. ALFiNi, supra note 11, at 73-140. See also supra note 39
and accompanying text.
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instructions preserve the law as perceived to be applicable by the trial
judge, most appeals on the law revolve around the instructions.
One can of course argue that there might be much to gain if these
intralawyer discussions were conducted in simplified language and
that no true professional interest militates against simplified instruc-
tions. That view overlooks the possibility that legal language serves
some useful purposes that may be lost if simplified. The extensive use
of specialized language in all fields, including social science, suggests
that all professionals find real value in its use. Simplified jury instruc-
tions trade off these values in favor of juror comprehension. When
the value of specialized language is dubious, common sense leads to
the conclusion that little is lost in exchanging the legal jargon for sim-
plified instructions. The value of specialized legal language, however,
is not always questionable. The task of the legal profession is to iden-
tify those legitimate uses of specialized legal language that, if aban-
doned through a rigid commitment to juror comprehension, may
create problems equal to or greater than jury misunderstanding.
There may be several plausible explanations for the extensive use
of jargon. A cynical explanation is that each profession seeks to insu-
late itself from competition by use of terms only its members are
trained to understand. It is doubtful that this explanation has much
force given the alternative means available to the legal profession to
secure its monopoly.
The most often asserted justification for specialized language is
that it communicates some subtlety of meaning that cannot be dupli-
cated in simplified English. It is a common assertion that there are
terms in other languages or in specialized professional jargon that can-
not be translated exactly into common English. There are legal terms
for which a single common word cannot be found, but if one is
prepared to write expansively most legal terms can be sensibly
explained. 65
If there are in fact some legal terms that are so subtle as to defy
simplification, they may reflect distinctions that are not sufficiently
important to capture in a jury instruction. There must be some appro-
priate point at which the gains from refinement in legal doctrine ex-
ceed the process costs of implementation. Legal terms that cannot be
simplified may signal a need to rethink the legal distinction.
65. The "subtlety of meaning" involved in a term of art (in law or any other disci-
pline producing jargon) attaches as a function of usage, and not because of any
inherent property of the word itself. The process of education in a specialty at-
taches connotations to a word that are unavailable to those outside the specialty.
"The speaking of a language is part of an activity or a form of life." L. WrrrGEN-
STEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 23 (1953). This suggests that any term of
art can be translated for a jury, although a sufficient explanation may be lengthy.
See also supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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A more plausible explanation for jargon is that it facilitates effi-
cient communication between professionals. By analogy to price the-
ory, if the "supply" of communication is measured by the output of the
speaker, the "demand" for communication must be the amount of re-
ception by the listener. Communication presumably requires some
equilibrium of output and input and at least on the time dimension
supply might easily outrun demand.
The point is the old one of not using four words when one will do.
Professionals use jargon to reach an equilibrium of communication. 66
Very often, simplification of these terms requires breaking out a vari-
ety of different thoughts and greatly lengthening the verbiage neces-
sary to communicate the same concept. This can be seen in the Alaska
instructions where the terms "bailor" and "bailee" were avoided at the
expense of greatly lengthening the instructions. 67
To the extent that the legal process requires intraprofessional com-
munication as well as communication with the juror, the attempts to
simplify language may have their costs in efficiency of communication
between the lawyers and the judge and the appellate courts. And,
even looking exclusively at the jury, there must be some point where
the length of an instruction begins to diminish the gains from
simplification.
It is also possible that some of the obfuscation associated with legal
terms of art is not only intentional but necessary for the legal system
to function. Courts, unlike other decisionmakers, cannot avoid deci-
sions; the disputes that are brought to court must be resolved. Intui-
tion and reason combine to surface the factors that are appropriately
applied to reach decisions, but oftentimes limitations of knowledge or
the costs of acquiring facts prevent application of these factors with
any degree of certainty.
In personal injury cases, intuition confirms that victims suffer sub-
stantial detriments beyond their out of pocket costs, but our ability to
measure these intangible losses is limited. To instruct a jury that they
may award damages for "the nature and extent of the injury" or for
"pain and suffering" may cause initial confusion or lack of under-
standing, but it permits the cases to be decided.
The costs of fact-gathering may also be prohibitive. In trademark
cases the second user of a mark is liable only if his use will create a
66. This notion is similar to the concept of a "language game" found in linguistic
philosophy. The use of the "game" concept focuses on the idea that language is a
goal-oriented activity conducted according to rules. To complete the economic
analogy, imagine two masters playing chess, as opposed to a player teaching the
rules to a neophyte. See L. WIrrGENSTEIN, THE BLUE AND BROWN BooKs 81
(1958). See generally Carpenter, Wittgenstein's Language.Game-A Tool for Cog-
nitive Developmentalists, 4 TRANSACTIONS NEB. AcAD. Sci. 161 (1977).
67. See supra note 55.
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"substantial likelihood of confusion among consumers." Testing ju-
rors as to what they think "substantial" means or what they think
"likelihood of confusion" means would produce divergent responses.
Yet if the law were to be more specific and thus more simple-if it
were to say, for example, that sixty-five percent of prospective cus-
tomers must be confused by the mark-the costs of trademark litiga-
tion would rise considerably. And to the extent that trademark
enforcement costs increase, the value of trademarks declines.
Ambiguity of doctrine may also be designed to give the appearance
of stability with the reality of growth and change. Cases with histori-
cally heavy jury involvement seem to have core concepts that are not
and cannot be clear or simple. What is negligent today may not be
negligent tomorrow. Just as constitutional phrases such as "due pro-
cess" are adjusted with the times, perhaps notions of "reasonable
doubt" or some issues of intention in the criminal law should also fol-
low the ebb and flow of community consensus. There is much to be
said for certainty and comprehension in the law just as there is com-
fort and understanding in viewing a photograph or a realistic painting.
But at times the law may also need to be viewed like an abstract ex-
pressionist painting where the response evoked is more emotional
than rational and where the true meaning lies in the eye of the
beholder.
B. Practical Limitations on Simplifying Instructions
Although in many instances the benefits of juror comprehension
may outweigh the perceived need for specialized legal language, the
implementation of simplified instructions may be limited by practical
considerations. In evaluating the prospects of or planning strategy for
reform, it seems important to recognize the different realities that
confront the relevant parties.
Whatever the style of the instructions, they will inevitably emerge
from an adversary process in which two lawyers seek to have the in-
structions read to favor their respective clients. Lawyers may believe
it is in their best interest to resist simplified instructions. The instruc-
tions are only a fraction of what the jury hears. To some extent the
judge and the lawyers engage in a three-sided contest to educate the
jury. The lawyer, particularly in closing argument, but also at various
other stages throughout the trial, has an opportunity to educate the
jurors as to how they should decide the case. To the extent the judge's
similar message is garbled or difficult to understand, the greater the
latitude the lawyer has to have his message adopted.68
68. The situation is analogous to the seriatim charge given to the early law-finding
juries. In a seriatim charge, "each judge was free to state to the jury his opinion
of the law and each jury was free to select the opinion it preferred .... W.
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The trial judge, of course, will ultimately decide which instructions
are given. If the trial judge is sensitive to the prospects of reversal on
appeal, he can be counted on to move toward instructions that do not
unduly favor either side. But he may also have a tendency to repeat
language of the appellate courts to assure legal accuracy. Increasing
judicial caseloads make it less likely that trial judges will take the
time to simplify their instructions. It is not uncommon for trial judges
to require the lawyers to submit instructions and for judges to work
with these submitted instructions at least as a starting point.
Trial judges may have other goals that tend to make jury instruc-
tions longer then necessary in a particular case. In jurisdictions where
judges are not free to comment on or to summarize the evidence,
judges may tend to extend the instructions to accomplish the same
result. Instructions that explain general concepts like negligence by
listing or ranking factors the jury should use in reaching its decision
are subtle forms of judicial comment.
C. Inherent Limitations on Instruction Reform
In addition to these restraints within the legal process, there are
some built-in limits to the ability of instruction drafting to clarify the
law for lay jurors. No jury instruction can clarify a law that is itself
ambiguous. An example given in one of the social science studies to
demonstrate the need for improved drafting techniques involved a
case in which the court was criticized for adopting an instruction on
intent that was a mirror image of statutory language.6 9 The social sci-
entist argued the example demonstrated that clarity could be best
achieved by avoiding repetition of statutory language-an argument
with which I wholeheartedly agree. But the appellate court reversed,
not because the instruction was ambiguous, but because the statute
was too ambiguous to support a criminal conviction.70 Amendment by
instruction is a peculiar method of legal reform.
Nor should restyled jury instructions be used to reform legal doc-
trines that may have been purposely designed to provide an open-
ended opportunity for the jury to follow its own sentiments. Much of
the discussion in the social science literature focuses on the instruc-
tions surrounding the definition of "reasonable doubt."71 There is
much empiricism to suggest that individual jurors have difficulty with
NELSON, supra note 31, at 166. Similarly, a garbled or incomprehensible instruc-
tion allows a modern jury, limited in theory to fact-finding, greater latitude to
engage in policy choices. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
69. Severance, Greene & Loftus, supra note 44, at 200-01.
70. State v. Shipp, 93 Wash. 2d 510, 515, 610 P.2d 1322, 1325 (1980).
71. See, e.g., Elwork I, supra note 11; Farrell, supra note 2, at 24; Severance, Greene &
Loftus, supra note 44, at 203-04; Severance & Loftus, supra note 44, at 172; Strawn
& Buchanan, supra note 35, at 481-82.
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the concept. However, the answer may not be to refine the definition
of reasonable doubt. Indeed, there were several questionable attempts
by judges to define the standard of reasonable doubt in terms of a per-
centage of certainty, e.g., ninety-percent certainty.72
Defining reasonable doubt may be a task that justifiably requires
the jury to exploit its own intuition and common sense. Of course the
jury can be told that the state must prove the elements of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. But beyond that, there may be nothing
more of content then the jury's deliberative and collegial views of the
matter.
There is a view within Anglo-American jurisprudence that it is
quite proper for a jury to follow its own conscience rather than the
legal rules reflected in the instructions.73 One has a difficult case de-
fending the jury system if its decisionmaking process is too rigidly
cabined by the judge's instructions. It can hardly be thought that the
jury is a more efficient or a more sensitive fact-finder than an exper-
ienced trial judge. The empirics tell us that juries lack understanding
of the instructions on the law, and common sense suggests that it may
be easier for the judge to apply the law than to tell a jury how to do so.
If the commitment to the jury system means anything, presumably
the jury is to bring a community's conscience to bear on legal disputes,
to moderate and perhaps eventually to amend the more insulated pro-
fessional viewpoint. There may be within the justification for the jury
a built-in percentage of departure from instructions that is explained
not because the jury misunderstood the problem but because they un-
derstood it all too well.
My last point is in some sense to state the obvious but the implica-
tions to me seem difficult to resolve. Law teachers must be amused at
how some regard as startling the fact that jurors do not have one-
hundred percent comprehension of the instructions. Indeed, some of
us would regard a seventy-five percent accuracy rate averaged over
the students in our classes as remarkable. The fact is that education is
72. These cases are usually reversed on the theory that quantification of the burden
allows the jury to convict on something less than the "subjective state of near
certitude" required by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979). See, e.g., U.S.
v. Anglada, 524 F.2d 296, 300 (2d Cir. 1975) ("bundle of twigs" analogy impermissi-
ble); Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 802, _, 482 N.E.2d 1198, 1200
(1985) (speculation on quantitative nature of burden produces reversal). See gen-
erally Simon & Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof. A View from the Bench,
the Jury, and the Classroom, 5 L. & Soc'y REv. 319, 324 (1971).
73. This is the phenomenon of "jury nullification," which continues to be a source of
controversy. See Farrell, supra note 2, at 22. Compare Marshall, Jurors Must
Respect the Law, 72 A.B.A. J. Mar. 1, 1986, at 36, with Osterman, Law Must Re-
spect Consciences, 72 A.B.A. J. Mar. 1, 1986, at 36. See generally Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 938-42 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd
sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
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not an easy task in the best of circumstances and jury instructions are
not the best of circumstances even in the best of circumstances.
V. CONCLUSION
The work of social scientists in confirming the fact of juror misun-
derstanding of instructions has significantly enhanced the opportuni-
ties for real reform. There is evidence, here and there, that progress is
being made and will continue to be made toward simplified jury in-
structions. The best hope for significant change lies with trial and ap-
pellate courts that can insist that the instructions submitted to them-
and the pattern instructions developed under their auspices-be free
of unnecessary complexity.
Although the movement toward simplified jury instructions is only
in its infancy, it may still be important at this stage to consider the
ultimate objectives and some of the limitations and restraints that
might appropriately temper reform. In the end, perfect comprehen-
sion by jurors is unattainable and, when measured against the func-
tion of the jury, perhaps undesirable.
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APPENDIX A
Federal Criminal Jury Instructions
S. Saltzburg & H. Perlman
(Vol. 2, Miche 1985)
24.01
MAIL FRAUD
In this case the government charges that the defendant(s) [insert
name(s)] (is) (are) guilty of using the United States mail to commit a fraud.
To find the defendant(s) guilty as charged, you must believe beyond a reason-
able doubt that the following things are true:
1. that the defendant deliberately:
(a) used a trick or participated in a plan to cause someone else to
act upon a false impression about a state of facts; or
(b) obtained money or property by [insert one or more of the
following: "making a false statement of a material fact"; "mak-
ing a promise he did not intend to keep"; "pretending some-
thing was true that was not true"]; or
(c) created a false impression about a state of facts by failing to
disclose a material fact in circumstances in which he had a duty to
disclose; and
2. the defendant intended to cause someone to act on a false impression
of a state of facts; and
3. the United States mail was used in an important way to execute the
fraud, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the
fraud would involve the use of the United States mail.
Unless you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that all of these things are
true, you must find the defendant not guilty.
24.05
SCHEME OR ARTIFICE TO DEFRAUD
The government claims the defendant deliberately participated in a plan
to cause someone else to act upon a false impression about a state of facts.
The government has tried to prove a plan existed by showing a number of
things were done as part of a plan. For you to find that such a plan existed,
you do not have to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that each of these
things happened; but, you do have to believe enough of these things happened
so that you also believe beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a plan to
cause someone else to act upon a false impression about a state of facts.
A plan can be formed or carried out by one person or by many persons.
To find the defendant guilty as charged, you do not have to believe the
plan succeeded or that anyone lost money or that anyone profited from the
plan.
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24.07
MATERIALITY
The government charges the defendant with (making a false statement
of a material fact; leaving a false impression by omitting a material
fact). I will now explain how you decide whether a particular fact is
"material."
A fact is material if a reasonable person would attach importance to the
fact in making a decision.
24.08
"INTENT" (DELIBERATELY) DEFINED
To find that the defendant committed a fraud "deliberately," you must
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that either he:
1. knew he was causing or was likely to cause a person to act upon a false
impression of a state of facts; or
2. had serious doubts about whether or not he was causing or was likely
to cause a person to act upon a false impression of a state of facts; or
(3. deliberately closed his eyes to what would otherwise be obvious
to him and in this way avoided determining whether or not he was
causing or was likely to cause a person to act upon a false impression
of a state of facts.)
The defendant did not act deliberately if he caused a false impression by
an honest or careless or inadvertent mistake.
24.09
GOOD FAITH
A person does not commit a deliberate fraud if his words and actions are
done in good faith. A person speaks or acts in good faith if
(1. He honestly believes that what he said is true); or
(2. He honestly believes that his business idea is practical and has a
reasonable chance of success even though you might believe with the
benefit of hindsight that the plan was impractical and unlikely to suc-
ceed); or
(3. He honestly intends to carry out his promises.)
24.11
USE OF JURISDICTIONAL FACILITIES
To find the defendant(s) guilty as charged, you must believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that the United States mail was used in an important way to
execute the fraud, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known
that the mails would be used to help carry out the fraud.
(The fraud involved the use of the mails if you believe beyond a
1986]
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reasonable doubt that [insert claim of government as to use of mails
sufficient to constitute jurisdiction, i.e., the defendant knew that re-
ceipts for purchase of stock would be mailed to the purchaser].)
(The use of the mails is important if the use is more than incidental
or collateral to execution of the fraud.)
APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCE
APPENDIX B
Federal Criminal Jury Instructions
S. Saltzburg & H. Perlman
(Vol. 2, MAiche 1985)
40.02
"OBSCENITY" DEFINED
The Constitution of the United States protects freedom of speech. The
Constitution does not protect obscene material, however. In this case, the
government claims that [describe material--e.g., book, movie, etc.] is ob-
scene. If you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that this is correct, then the
defendant may be convicted and punished for mailing it. If you do not believe
this beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty.
Freedom of speech is one of the most important rights protected by our
Constitution. You should keep this in mind as you decide whether or not the
[describe material] is obscene.
Something is not obscene simply because you do not like it.
Something is not obscene simply because you disagree with it.
Something is not obscene simply because it involves sex.
Something is not obscene simply because it involves nudity.
Something is not obscene simply because it offends your personal taste.
To find a [describe material] obscene, you must examine the [describe
material] as a whole, not looking at isolated parts. And you must believe
beyond a reasonable doubt three things:
1. That it has no serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value; and
2. That the average person who considered the [describe material] as a
whole, not looking at isolated parts, in the light of contemporary community
standards would find that the [describe material] shows (describes) sexual
acts in a patently offensive way; and
3. That the main theme of the [describe material] appeals to an interest
in sex that the average person would regard as unhealthy and undesirable.
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APPENDIX C
Federal Jury Practice and Instructions
E. Devitt & C. Blackmar
(Vol. 2, 3d ed. West 1977)
§ 62.03 "Obscene"-Defined
Although the indictment includes the words of the statute, namely,
the adjectives "obscene", "lewd", "lascivious", "indecent" and "filthy",
the gist of the offense alleged in the indictment is the charge that the
defendant willfully misused the United States mail for the delivery of
obscene photographs or pictures.
"Obscene" means something which deals with sex in a manner
such that the predominant appeal is to prurient interest; which, by the
current standards of the community as a whole; and which, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
An appeal to prurient interest is an appeal to a morbid interest in
sex, as distinguished from a candid interest in sex.
APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCE
APPENDIX D
Alaska Pattern Civil Jury Instructions
H. Perlman & S. Saltzburg
(1981)
21.01 INTRODUCTION
In this case [the plaintiff (name of plaintiff) claims] the defendant
(name of defendant) obtained possession of plaintiff's (insert bailed
article). The plaintiff claims a loss (losses) resulting from
(1) (damage) (destruction) of the (insert bailed article) for which
the plaintiff claims the defendant is responsible; and
(2) failure of the defendant to return the (insert bailed article)
when requested to do so; and
(3) unauthorized use of the (insert bailed article) by the defendant.
The plaintiff wants the defendant to pay him for this loss [these
losses]. The defendant denies that he is legally responsible for this
loss [these losses].
21.02 BAILMENT CONTESTED
The plaintiff says the defendant obtained possession of the plain-
tiff's (insert bailed article) in the following way:
(Insert claim of bailment)
If you decide that it is more likely than not that the defendant ob-
tained possession of the plaintiff's (insert bailed article) in the way the
plaintiff says, you must consider plaintiff's claim(s) that the defendant
should pay (him) for (his) loss. If you decide otherwise, you must re-
turn a verdict for the defendant.
21.03 BAILEE'S LIABILITY-DAMAGE TO GOODS
I will now describe the plaintiff's [first] claim and how you must
decide it.
The plaintiff claims that after the defendant obtained possession of
the (insert bailed article), but before the defendant returned it to the
plaintiff or to (insert a person authorized by the plaintiff to receive it),
the item was (damaged).
You must decide if it is more likely than not that this is true. If it
is, then the defendant must pay for the plaintiff's loss unless (he) is
excused for a reason that I will explain to you. Otherwise, the defend-
ant does not have to pay anything.
21.04 EXCUSE--REASONABLE CARE
Now that I have described the plaintiff's (first) claim to you, I will
describe the defendant's claim that the law excuses (him) from re-
sponsibility for any harm suffered by the plaintiff.
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The defendant (first) claims he is excused from legal responsibility
because (he) took reasonable care under the circumstances to protect
the (insert bailed article) from harm. A person uses reasonable care
when he does what a reasonably careful person would do under simi-
lar circumstances.
You must decide if it is more likely than not that the defendant
used reasonable care. If he did, the defendant is excused from legal
responsibility and does not have to pay for the plaintiff's loss. Other-
wise, the defendant is not excused [for this reason].
APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCE
APPENDIX E
Colorado Supreme Court Committee on Civil Jury Instructions,
Colorado Jury Instructions 2d - Civil
(1978)
16:1 BAILMENT-BAILOR-BAILEE--DEFINED
A bailment is a delivery of personal property by one person to an-
other, for a special object or purpose, to be returned when that pur-
pose is accomplished.
A bailor is the person who delivers the property and a bailee is the
person who receives it.
16:2 BAILOR NOT LIABLE TO THIRD PERSONS FOR NEGLI-
GENCE OF BAILEE
A bailor is not legally responsible to third persons for injuries or
damages caused by any negligent use of the personal property by the
bailee.
16:3 GRATUITOUS BAILMENT-DUTY OF BAILOR TO BAILEE
A bailor (lending) (furnishing) an article without payment (or
other consideration) owes a duty to the bailee to warn him of dangers
or defects in the article which are known to the bailor and which
make the article dangerous in its intended use and which the bailee
could not have been expected to discover by the exercise of reasonable
care. The bailor owes no duty to inspect the article to see that it is free
from defects or dangers.
16:4 NON-GRATUITOUS BAILMENT-DUTY OF NON-COMMER-
CIAL BAILOR TO BAILEE
A bailor who furnishes an article (for payment) (or) (for some re-
ciprocal benefit) owes a duty to the bailee either:
1. to use reasonable care to provide that the article is safe for its
intended use and is free from any defects of which the bailor has
knowledge or could have discovered by a reasonable inspection; or
2. to warn the bailee of any known defect or of any failure on the
bailor's part to make a reasonable inspection.
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APPENDIX F
Federal Criminal Jury Instructions
S. Saltzburg & H. Perlman
(Vol. 2, 1985)
20.10
"RELEVANT MARKET" DEFINED
In order to decide whether a restraint of trade has an adverse effect on
competition, you must first define the relevant market in which the restraint
is claimed to have that effect. The term "relevant market" has two separate
parts: The first is called the product market; the second is called the geo-
graphic market.
In this case the government claims that the relevant product market is
[insert government's claim].
To define the relevant product market you are really being asked to de-
cide which products compete with those made by the defendant. Products are
in the same product market, that is they compete with each other, if, as a
practical matter, a substantial number of buyers regard the products as rea-
sonable substitutes for each other considering their respective prices, uses,
and special characteristics. Some products are almost perfect substitutes.
One bushel of corn is usually a near perfect substitute for another bushel of
corn. On the other hand two products do not have to be identical to be in the
same product market.
In this case the government claims the relevant geographic market is [in-
sert government's claim].
To define the relevant geographic market you are really being asked to
decide which firms within the relevant product market compete with the de-
fendant. Firms compete with each other if a potential buyer might rationally
turn to either firm for the products he needs or if either firm might rationally
offer what the buyer needs. The geographic area of competition may be small
or as large as the entire United States or larger.
[Vol. 65:520
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APPENDIX G
Federal Jury Practice and Instructions
E. Devitt & C. Blackmar
(Vol. 3, 3d ed. West 1977)
§ 90.28 "Relevant Market" Explained
Within the broad, world-wide market for the products in issue, sub-
markets may exist which in themselves constitute product markets
for agricultural purposes.
The boundaries of such a sub market may be determined by exam-
ining such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the sub
market as a separate economic entity; the products peculiar character-
istics and uses; economic production facilities; distinct customers; dis-
tinct prices; sensitivity to price changes and specialized vendors.
Congress prescribed a pragmatic, factual approach to the definition
of the relevant market, and not a formal or legalistic one.
In determining the relevant market, the "area of effective competi-
tion" must be determined by reference to a product market and a geo-
graphic market.
The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the
reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand
between the product itself and substitutes for it.
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APPENDIX H
Federal Criminal Jury Instructions
S. Saltburg & H. Perlman
(Vol. 2, Miche 1985)
33.08
PERMISSIVE INFERENCES; RECENT POSSESSION
If you find that the defendant possessed a stolen [insert object] that had
recently been moved from inside a state to outside of that state, you may
reason that he knew that [insert object] was stolen and that he either moved
the [insert object] or had someone else move it for him. But you are not
required to reason in this way. You must decide whether this evidence is
important and how important it may be.
(A person has possession of an object if he has it on his person or if
it is in a place where he alone or with others has control over it.)
(You may consider the length of time that passed between a theft
and possession in deciding whether to reason that if the defendant pos-
sessed [insert object], he knew that it was stolen and he either moved
it or had someone else move it for him.)
APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCE
APPENDIX I
Federal Jury Practice and Procedure
E. Devitt & C. Blackmar
(Vol. 1, 3d ed. West 1977)
§ 15.02 Direct Evidence-Circumstantial Evidence
There are two types of evidence from which you may find the truth
as to the facts of a case-direct and circumstantial evidence. Direct
evidence is the testimony of one who asserts actual knowledge of a
fact, such as an eyewitness; circumstantial evidence is proof of a chain
of facts and circumstances indicating the guilt or innocence of a de-
fendant. The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given
to either direct or circumstantial evidence. Nor is a greater degree of
certainty required of circumstantial evidence than of direct evidence.
You should weigh all the evidence in the case. After weighing all the
evidence, if you are not convinced of the guilt of the defendant beyond
a reasonable doubt, you must find him not guilty.
§15.03 Inferences from Evidence
Inferences are deductions or conclusions which reason and com-
mon sense lead the jury to draw from facts which have been estab-
lished by the evidence in the case.
As applied to this case, the law declares that you may regard proof
of (presence of the defendant at a still) as sufficient evidence that (he
is engaged in the business of distilling). The law, however, does not
require you to so find. You are the sole judge of the facts. Since proof
(that the defendant is engaged in distilling) is an essential element of
the offense charged in the indictment, as defined elsewhere in these
instructions, you may not find the defendant guilty unless you find
beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant (is engaged in distilling
without having given bond).
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APPENDIX J
Alaska Pattern Civil Jury Instructions
H. Perlman & S. Saltzburg
(1981)
3.01 NEGLIGENCE-WHEN PLAINTIFF ENTITLED
TO RECOVER
The plaintiff, (name) claims that (he) was (injured) (damaged) be-
cause of the negligence of the defendant, (name), and wants payment
from the defendant for (his) loss. For the plaintiff to win on this claim
you must decide that it is more likely than not both
1. that the defendant was negligent, and
2. that the negligence was a legal cause of the plaintiff's loss.
I will define negligence and legal cause for you in a few moments.
3.03A NEGLIGENCE DEFINED
I will now explain negligence to you.
A person is negligent if he does not use reasonable care. Negli-
gence may result from action or inaction. A person is negligent if he
does not act as a reasonably careful person would act under similar
circumstances.
In this case you must decide whether or not (plaintiff) (defendant)
(both plaintiff or defendant) used reasonable care under the
circumstances.
[Vol. 65:520
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APPENDIX K
The Committee on Standard Jury Instructions, Civil
of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California
California Jury Instructions-Civil
(1977)
BAJI 3.10
NEGLIGENCE AND ORDINARY CARE
DEFINITIONS
Negligence is the doing of something which a reasonably prudent
person would not do, or the failure to do something which a reason-
ably prudent person would do, under circumstances similar to those
shown by the evidence.
It is the failure to use ordinary or reasonable care.
Ordinary or reasonable care is that care which persons of ordinary
prudence would use in order to avoid injury to themselves or others
under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX L
Federal Criminal Jury Instructions
S. Saltzburg & H. Perlman
(Vol. 1, Miche 1985)
3.59
"REASONABLE DOUBT" DEFINED
You will hear me say throughout my instructions on the specific charges
made against the defendant(s) by the government that you may not convict
the defendant(s) of any crime unless you believe that he is (they are) guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. It is the government that brings charges and it is
the government that must prove these charges. It must prove them beyond a
reasonable doubt.
[Although the following two paragraphs are provided for judges
who believe some further definition is required, we believe the first
paragraph is sufficient.]
Few things in life are absolutely certain. To say that you believe
something beyond a reasonable doubt is to say that you are confident
in your judgment. It does not require you to be absolutely certain.
You may have a reasonable doubt about something if you are hesitant
to accept it as true after you evaluate the evidence.
You must carefully examine the evidence that has been presented
to you and recall the arguments concerning the significance of that
evidence. You must carefully weigh that evidence and analyze the ar-
guments. You must pay careful attention to the law that I give you.
And then you must ask yourselves whether on the basis of your reason
and judgment you have a reasonable doubt about the matters I in-
struct you to decide. You must find the defendant not guilty when you
have a reasonable doubt. You may find him guilty when you have
none.
[Vol. 65:520
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APPENDIX M
Federal Jury Practice and Instructions
E. Devitt & C. Blackmar
(Vol. 1, 3d ed. West 1977)
§ 11.14 Burden of Proof-Reasonable Doubt
The law presumes a defendant to be innocent of crime. Thus a de-
fendant, although accused, begins the trial with a "clean slate"-with
no evidence against him. And the law permits nothing but legal evi-
dence presented before the jury to be considered in support of any
charge against the accused. So the presumption of 'innocence alone is
sufficient to acquit a defendant, unless the jurors are satisfied beyond
a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt after careful and impartial
consideration of all the evidence in the case.
It is not required that the government prove guilt beyond all possi-
ble doubt. The test is one of reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a
doubt based upon reason and common sense-the kind of doubt that
would make a reasonable person hesitate to act. Proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt must, therefore, be proof of such a convincing character
that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it in
the most important of his own affairs.
The jury will remember that a defendant is never to be convicted
on mere suspicion or conjecture.
The burden is always upon the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. This burden never shifts to a defendant; for the law
never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty
of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence.
So if the jury, after careful and impartial consideration of all the
evidence in the case, has a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty
of the charge, it must acquit. If the jury views the evidence in the case
as reasonably permitting either of two conclusions-one of innocence,
the other of guilt-the jury should of course adopt the conclusion of
innocence.
1986]
